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Sandin v. Conner. Redefining State Prisoners' Liberty
Interest and Due Process Rights
The Fifth' and Fourteenth2 Amendments to the Constitution
guarantee that the government will not arbitrarily interfere with our
movements nor restrain our liberty without due process of law. For
a free man or woman, the scope of liberty is "broad indeed,"3 and its
limitation is the exception rather than the rule. However, what
constitutes the "liberty" interest of a prison inmate who has been
legally deprived of freedom by conviction and sentencing? Does a
prisoner retain every liberty not expressly taken away by his
sentence?' Does he lose all liberty except that expressly created by
the state within the prison walls?' Or does the answer lie somewhere
in between? Finally, what is the role of the federal courts in
protecting the liberty of individual state prisoners from arbitrary and
unwarranted deprivation?6 These are questions the Supreme Court
has struggled with for decades and which it faced again in Sandin v.
Conner.7 In an opinion that reflects the continuing split on the Court
as to the source of prisoners' liberty interests8 and the role of federal
courts in overseeing state prison decisions,9 the Sandin Court
struggled with defining the circumstances under which state prison
regulations give rise to liberty interests that are protected under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
1. "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
4. See Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) ("A prisoner retains all
the rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken
from him by law.").
5. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 42-43, 61-66 and accompanying text.
7. 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
8. See infra notes 34-41, 44-58 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 55-56, 176-88 and accompanying text.
10. See Sandin, 115 U.S. at 2295. Any due process analysis must first answer whether
process is required before examining how much process is sufficient. See, e.g., Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("Once it is determined that due process applies, the
question remains what process is due."). In an opinion delivered the same term as Morris-
sey, the Court further explored the issue of when due process requirements are trig-
gered-the "whether" question. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972)
(stating that an interest must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment's liberty or property
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Clearly, the prisoner is no longer considered a "slave of the
State,"" subject to any sort of treatment or abuse without redress.
However, neither is the prisoner entitled to "the full panoply of rights
due a defendant in [criminal] proceedings"'2 before he can be subject
to discipline by the state. Between these two extremes, the Court
held in Sandin that liberty interests arise only when the restraint
contemplated "imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate
in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life."' 3 In so holding,
the Court abandoned the line of reasoning, developed in cases since
Hewitt v. Helms, 4 which gleaned the existence of a prisoner's liberty
interest from "mandatory" language in state statutes or prison
regulations.15
This Note first discusses the facts and procedural history of
Sandin.6 It then briefly describes the majority and dissenting
opinions 7 before charting the development of prisoners' due process
protections in the federal courts and the context in which the Sandin
decision arose. 8  This Note also examines the assumptions upon
which the decision is based 9 and the potential consequences Sandin
will have for state prisoners seeking relief in federal court.2'
DeMont Conner was serving a sentence of thirty years to life in
Hawaii's maximum security Halawa Correctional Facility for murder
protection in order to trigger due process). See infra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
Four years later, the Court developed its analysis for determining how much process would
be constitutionally sufficient. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976) (stating
that the weighing process must take into account both the private and governmental
interests at stake and the probable benefit of additional procedural protections). But cf.
James E. Robertson, Judicial Review of Prison Discipline in the United States and England:
A Comparative Study of Due Process and Natural Justice, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1323,
1341 n.164 (1989) (noting that prior to 1972 the question of how much process should be
given was not generally discussed separately from whether process applied). Because the
Sandin Court found that Conner did not have a liberty interest in remaining free from
disciplinary segregation, and therefore was not entitled to procedural protections, it did not
reach the second part of this analysis. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302.
11. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. 1024, 1026 (21 Gratt. 790, 796) (1871).
12. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974) (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488).
13. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
14. 459 U.S. 460 (1983) (holding that Pennsylvania regulations governing state prison
administration give rise to prisoner liberty interest in avoiding administrative segregation
because of mandatory language limiting official discretion); see infra notes 126-36 and
accompanying text.
15. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472.
16. See infra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 32-60 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 61-164 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 165-88 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 189-203 and accompanying text.
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and other violent crimes.2 When Conner responded with abusive
and obscene language to a strip search conducted by a prison officer,
he was charged with "high misconduct" for his obstructive behavior
and "low moderate misconduct" for harassment of a prison
employee.' Conner was notified of the charges and appeared
before an adjustment committee that found him guilty and sentenced
him to thirty days in "disciplinary segregation."' Conner was not
allowed to present witnesses at the hearing.24
Conner sought administrative review of the charges.' Nine
months later, the deputy administrator found the "high misconduct"
charge to be unsupported, and Conner's disciplinary record was
accordingly expunged.26 Meanwhile, Conner filed a complaint under
42 U.S.C. § 198327 seeking, in part, damages for deprivation of
procedural due process in connection with the disciplinary hearing.'
The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted
summary judgment in favor of the prison officials.29 The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Conner had a "liberty
interest" in remaining free from disciplinary segregation and thus was
entitled to call witnesses at his hearing." The court based its
decision on a prison regulation from which it drew the negative
inference that disciplinary segregation could not be imposed absent
a finding of "substantial evidence" of misconduct by the adjustment
committee.3'
21. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2295.
22. Id. at 2296. Hawaii's prison regulations enumerate and rank offenses by severity
and establish available sanctions for each level of misconduct. Id at 2296 n.1; see also
infra note 41 (discussing the delegation of rule-making authority to corrections
department).




27. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured ....
Id.
28. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296.
29. Id.
30. Conner v. Sakai, 15 F.3d 1463, 1466 (9th Cir. 1993), rev'd sub nom. Sandin v.
Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293 (1995).
31. Id. The court of appeals held that a liberty interest was at stake in the outcome
of the factual inquiry and, therefore, Conner was entitled to call witnesses as part of the
process he was due under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Conner, 15 F.3d at
19961 1763
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In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals z While not explicitly overruling precedent, 3 the Court
disavowed the methodology of Hewitt and later cases which used a
two-part test of "substantive predicates" and "mandatory language"
to determine whether liberty interests arose from state statutes and
prison regulations. 4 Instead, the Court formulated a new test for
determining state-created liberty interests for prisoners?5 The Court
held that Conner did not have a liberty interest in remaining in the
general prison population.36  Because Conner's disciplinary
segregation "mirrored" conditions experienced by inmates in
nondisciplinary, administrative segregation, the Court found that it
"did not present the type of atypical, significant deprivation in which
a state might conceivably create a liberty interest.,
37
In rejecting the old test, which focused on formalistic
interpretations of prison regulations to determine whether the state
had created a protected liberty interest,38 the majority emphasized
the policy behind codified prison regulations?9 The Court noted that
the purpose of prison rules is to guide prison officials in their duties,
not to confer rights on prisoners,' and further, that the "mandatory
language" test created disincentives to states to codify prison regula-
tions for fear of creating liberty interests that would in turn trigger
procedural due process requirements.41 Additionally, the Court
1466-67.
32. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2295,2297. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of
the Court, in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined.
33. Id. at 2300 n.5.
34. Id. at 2298, 2300; see infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
35. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
36. Id. at 2301.
37. Id
38. Id. at 2300.
39. Id at 2299.
40. Id.
41. Id. The Supreme Court in Hewitt named "statutes and regulations" as sources of
state law which could give rise to protected liberty interests if they went beyond "simple
procedural guidelines... [and] used language of an unmistakably mandatory character."
Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,470-71 (1983). Following this lead, lower courts found that
other "expressions of state law" such as administrative rules, inmate handbooks, and
posted prison rules could also give rise to liberty interests. Robertson, supra note 10, at
1351. In fact, the typical prison governance system delegates broad authority to state
correction departments and prison officials to formulate and enforce the rules by which
prison life is regulated. See W. Anthony Fitch & Julian Tepper, An Introduction to Prison
Reform Legislation, 5 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 627, 628-29 (1972); Robertson, supra note
10, at 1328. An example of this type of delegatory statute is the Hawaii law in effect at
the time of Sandin's disciplinary action. By statute, the responsibility for prisons falls
1764 [Vol. 74
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stated that the Hewitt approach involved the federal judiciary too
deeply in the day-to-day affairs of state prisons,42 an attitude that
harkens back to the pre-1970 "hands-off" doctrine43 of the federal
courts.
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens in dissent,44 took up
the banner long held by Justice Marshall45 and insisted that the
majority's approach wrongly placed the source of prisoners' liberty
interests in state law rather than the Due Process Clause.' While
Justice Ginsburg indicated that Conner likely had received sufficient
procedural protection in this case,47 she took issue with the Court's
under the Department of Social Services and Housing; the director of social services
shall have the entire government, control, and supervision of state correctional
facilities... and of the administration thereof. The director may make and...
amend rules relating to the conduct and management of such facilities and the
care, control, treatment, furlough and discipline of persons committed to the
director's care, which rules... [are] valid and binding upon all inmates, officers,
and employees ....
HAW. REv. STAT. § 353-3 (1985).
42. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299.
43. The "hands off' doctrine is the theory that prisons generally are the responsibility
of the legislative and executive branches, and state prisons specifically are within the realm
of state laws and responsibility, and therefore the federal courts should not interfere. See,
e.g., Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684,688 (8th Cir. 1967) (stating that" 'it is settled doctrine
that except in extreme cases the courts may not interfere with the conduct of a prison, with
its regulations and their enforcement, or with its discipline' ") (quoting Lee v. Tahash, 352
F.2d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 1965)); McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1964)
(stating that due to security and safety concerns, prison officials "must have a wide
discretion... in imposing disciplinary sanctions"); Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771, 771
(10th Cir.) (per curiam) (stating that "[c]ourts are without power to supervise prison
administration or to interfere with the ordinary prison rules or regulations"), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 859 (1954). See generally Charles E. Friend, Note, Judicial Intervention in Prison
Administration, 9 WM. & MARY L. REV. 178,179-81 (1967) (describing policies and history
behind the "hands off" doctrine).
44. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
45. Justice Marshall and Justice Stevens frequently wrote for the minority in prisoners'
rights cases, championing the idea that prisoners retained inherent liberty rights by virtue
of the Due Process Clause and that to base such rights on state law was to "assume that
after his conviction a prisoner has, in essence, no liberty save that created, in writing, by
the State which imprisons him." Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 482 (1982) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also, eg., Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 467-
68 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he retained liberty interest protected by the
Constitution encompasses the right to be free from arbitrary governmental action affecting
significant personal interests."); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 251 (1983) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("[A]n inmate's liberty interest is not limited to whatever a State chooses
to bestow upon him.").
46. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2303 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
47. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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failure to recognize his liberty interest in remaining free from
disciplinary segregation.4
In a separate dissent, Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter,49
argued that the Court need not abandon its precedent and state a new
standard in order to protect inmates from important, as opposed to
insignificant, deprivations. 0 Justice Breyer pointed to the fact that
the Court historically had considered either the "nature" or severity
of a prisoner's deprivation in determining whether a liberty interest
was at stake, such as in Vitek v. Jones"1 and Washington v. Harper,"2
or state laws governing less severe deprivations. 3 He therefore criti-
cized the majority's attempt to define a new "minimum standard,"
which threatens to create uncertainty and invites varying interpreta-
tions in the lower courts.5 4
Justice Breyer acknowledged the majority's concern over federal
judicial involvement in day-to-day prison affairs and the potential for
due process procedural requirements for minor disciplinary matters.5
Defending his approach, however, he argued that it is possible to
distinguish those prisoner claims that clearly fall within the protection
of the Due Process Clause from those that are too trivial to merit
procedural protection.56 Further, he stated that he would keep the
"entitlement"57 approach of examining state law to determine liberty
interests in the "broad middle category" of prisoner restraints which
are not easily defined either as insignificant or as implicating
fundamental liberty.58
Both dissents sharply criticized the majority's reliance on the fact
that the State later expunged Conner's disciplinary record. 9 Justices
Ginsburg and Breyer emphasized that the nature of the loss
threatened or suffered must determine an individual's entitlement to
48. Id. at 2302 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
50. Id- at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
51. 445 U.S. 480 (1980); see infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
52. 494 U.S. 210 (1990); see infra notes 102-09 and accompanying text.
53. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
54. Id at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
55. Id (Breyer, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 2306-07 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
57. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,577 (1972) (holding that positive state
law could create a protected "entitlement"); infra text accompanying notes 71-73.
58. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2306-07 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2303 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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procedural protections, not the State's after-the-fact categorization of
its action.'
The Court's journey to the Sandin decision and the struggle over
defining state prisoners' liberty interests began with the opening of a
legal avenue for such claims to be heard. The 1961 decision Monroe
v. Pape"1 provided this opening, giving renewed life to the long-
dormant Civil Rights Act of 1871,62 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
"provide[s] a federal remedy for constitutional violations occurring
'under color' of state law."' By making the federal courts accessible
without first requiring the exhaustion of state remedies, Monroe
paved the way for state prisoners to seek relief in federal court for the
denial of constitutionally protected rights.6 Additionally, in the
following decade a growing number of lower federal court decisions
began to cast doubt on the "hands off" doctrine,65 and courts began
to take seriously prisoners' claims of unjust, arbitrary, and often
inhumane treatment at the hands of state prison officials. 66
Although neither involved a prisoner's suit, two cases in the early
1970s set the stage for a changed view of prisoners' right to due
process in disciplinary proceedings and for a philosophical split within
the Court as to the source of those rights-a split which is still evident
in Sandin.67  In Goldberg v. Kelly,68 the issue was whether an
60. Id. at 2303 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 2309 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
61. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
62. The act was originally § 1 of "[a]n Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes." 17 Stat.
13 (1871). For the text of § 1983 see supra note 27.
63. Robertson, supra note 10, at 1343-44.
64. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183 (holding that "[the] federal remedy is supplementary to
the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal
one is invoked"); see also William B. Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner
Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARv. L. REv. 610,612 n.20 (1979) (explaining
prisoners' preference for pursuing § 1983 claims as opposed to habeas corpus relief).
65. See supra note 43.
66. See, e.g., Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 1972) (stating that "when a
state prisoner makes specific allegations of unconstitutional treatment, the federal courts
must become involved"); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,189,204 (2d Cir. 1971) (holding
that inmate was improperly punished and discriminated against by prison officials on the
basis of his religious and political beliefs), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1049, and cert denied, 405
U.S. 978 (1972); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (holding that
permanent segregation of state prisoners by race violates the Fourteenth Amendment),
affd, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D.
Cal. 1966) (holding that state prisoners have a constitutional right, which may be enforced
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment).
67. See supra notes 34-38, 44-58 and accompanying text.
68. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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individual whose welfare benefits were to be terminated was entitled,
under the Due Process Clause, to a pre-termination hearing.69 The
Court held that "[t]he extent to which procedural due process must
be afforded ... is influenced by the extent to which [an individual]
may be 'condemned to suffer grievous loss.' "7 In Board of Regents
v. Roth,71 decided two years later, the Court held that an individual
is entitled to procedural protections when some source of positive law
creates a "legitimate claim of entitlement."'72 In Roth, the Court
refused to find that an untenured professor had a right to a hearing
on the nonrenewal of his contract because neither the terms of his
employment, state statute, nor university policy created any such
"legitimate claim of entitlement."'73
In these two decisions, the Court began to recognize what had
already been termed "the new property. '74  This new method of
defining protected interests75 did not, however, remain limited to
property interests. Lower courts began using the Goldberg analysis
in reviewing prison discipline cases.76 In 1972, the Supreme Court
also extended Goldberg beyond property interests in Morrissey v.
Brewer,77 applying the "grievous loss" test to the question of whether
the "requirements of due process in general apply to parole
revocations."78  However, application of the Goldberg "grievous
69. Id- at 255.
70. Id. at 263-64 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). The Goldberg Court also stated that a balancing
must occur between the government's interest in summary adjudication and the
individual's interest in avoiding the loss when determining whether and how much process
is sufficient. Id.; see supra note 10 (discussing later development of this balancing test in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)).
71. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
72. Id. at 577.
73. Id. at 578.
74. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE LJ. 733 (1964). Professor Reich
proposed this way of defining an individual's reliance on government benefits and
"largess" as a measure of his wealth and, thus, his property. Id. at 785-87.
75. "Protected interests" are life, liberty, and property. See supra note 2.
76. See, eg., Knell v. Bessinger, 489 F.2d 1014, 1018 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that 15
days in punitive isolation and loss of good time constituted "grievous loss" warranting
procedural safeguards); Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1083 (M.D. Fla.) (stating
that disciplinary and administrative segregation and loss of good time constituted grievous
losses), vacated on juris. grounds, 491 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 992
(1974); Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 781 (N.D. Cal. 1971) (stating that the
severity of potential punishment must be considered when determining whether prisoner
is subjected to a "grievous loss" requiring procedural protections), modified, 497 F.2d 809
(9th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
77. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
78. Id. at 481.
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loss" analysis did not retain its momentum in the realm of procedural
due process protections; ultimately it was overtaken by the Roth
entitlement theory.
79
A pivotal decision in the history of prisoners' due process claims
came in 1974 with Wolff v. McDonnell."° Wolff took the concept of
a "state-created right" and applied it to a prisoner's liberty interest in
a claim seeking the restoration of "good-time" credits.8 ' Finding that
the State itself had created a right to good-time credits and had
prescribed deprivation of the credits as a sanction for serious miscon-
duct, the Court held that the State had created an interest of "real
substance" and the prisoner was entitled to minimum due process
procedures to ensure that his liberty interest was not arbitrarily taken
away.'m Justice White, writing for the Court, reaffirmed that a
prisoner is not "stripped of constitutional protections"' and rejected
the State's assertion that "the interest of prisoners in disciplinary
procedures is not included in that 'liberty' protected by the Four-
teenth Amendment."'
While the Wolff Court explicitly adapted the Roth entitlement
theory to find a state-created liberty interest, its holding was arguably
broader and did not limit the sources of prisoners' liberty interests to
positive state law. 5 Further, by focusing on whether a prisoner's
right to "good time" was one of "real substance" 6 and by stating
that lesser penalties would not necessarily require procedural protec-
tions,s7 the Wolff Court also implicitly retained the reasoning of
"grievous loss" analysis.88  However, any expectations Wolff may
have engendered in prisoners that the Supreme Court had become
79. See infra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
80. 418 U.S. 539 (1974). Much of the significance of Wolff came from its delineation
of how much process was sufficient in the context of prison discipline cases. Sandin, 115
S. Ct. at 2297; see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 560-72. For the purposes of this Note, however, the
main focus will be on the Wolff Court's discussion of when due process liberty interests
are implicated in the first place.
81. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557. "Good time" credits work to reduce a prisoner's sentence
as a result of good behavior in prison. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,107 (1971).
82. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557.
83. Id. at 555.
84. Id. at 556-57.
85. Charles H. Jones, Jr. & Edward Rhine, Due Process and Prison Disciplinary
Practices: From Wolff to Hewitt, 11 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 44,
112-13 (1985).
86. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557.
87. Id. at 572 n.19.
88. Elizabeth Alexander, The New Prison Administrdtors and the Court New
Directions in Prison Law, 56 TEx. L. REv. 963, 979-80 (1978).
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receptive to their due process complaints were quickly dashed by two
decisions in 1976. Meachum v. Fano89 and Montanye v. Haymes90
both involved the transfer of an inmate to a prison other than the one
to which he had originally been assigned.9' In Meachum, the
majority explicitly disavowed the Goldberg analysis, stating that "[w]e
reject at the outset the notion that any grievous loss.., is sufficient
to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause."9"
The Court went on to embrace fully the Roth entitlement analysis for
determining prisoners' liberty interests.93 Rather than enlarge the
scope of protected interests for which prisoners could expect
procedural due process, as Wolff initially seemed to do, the Meachum
decision heralded a much narrower definition of a prisoner's liberty
interests.9 4 In essence, the majority held that, absent the creation of
a right by positive state law, the prison inmate had no liberty
interests.95 Thus, because the State had not provided any statutory
entitlement to remain in the prison to which an inmate had been
initially assigned, there was no liberty interest implicated in transfer
to another prison.96 Even if the conditions in the second institution
were more onerous, an inmate would not be entitled to a pre-transfer
hearing or other procedural protection before suffering such a
substantial deprivation.97
The decision in Montanye echoed this reasoning. The Court held
that no liberty interest requiring a hearing was at stake in a transfer
to another prison "absent some right or justifiable expectation rooted
in state law that [the prisoner] will not be transferred except for
misbehavior."" The Court further dismissed the need for judicial
oversight of a prisoner's treatment by prison authorities in any case
in which "the conditions or degree of confinement... [are] within the
sentence imposed upon him and [are] not otherwise violative of the
89. 427 U.S. 215 (1976).
90. 427 U.S. 236 (1976).
91. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 216; Montanye, 427 U.S. at 238.
92. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224.
93. Id.
94. IL; Alexander, supra note 88, at 981; Jones & Rhine, supra note 85, at 115.
95. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224 ("[G]iven a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has
been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him
and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement
do not otherwise violate the Constitution.").
96. Id at 225.
97. 1M
98. Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242.
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Constitution."99  This would hold true whether the action was
disciplinary or administrative.' ° Thus, the decisions in Meachum
and Montanye appeared to steer the Court plainly down the path of
entitlement analysis of liberty interests and away from the "grievous
loss" or impact analysis in the search for protected prisoner liberty
interests.''
However, the Court reemphasized in Vitek v. Jones"°a and
Washington v. Harper't" that some "residuum of liberty"'" is
retained by an inmate after conviction and that a change of condition
that is "qualitatively different" from the terms of his sentence
implicates due process protection independent of any state-created
right.0 These two cases involved, respectively, the involuntary
transfer of an inmate to a mental hospitalf ° and the involuntary
administration of psychotropic drugs to a prisoner."°  In both
instances, the Court found an independent basis for protection under
the Due Process Clause itself because the nature of the action to be
taken implicated a prisoner's fundamental "liberty" interest.' The
Court held that this type of state action was not within the "range of
confinement justified by imposition of a prison sentence.""
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process Rights of
Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482, 509-12 (1984). See
generally Thomas 0. Sargentich, Two Views of a Prisoner's Right to Due Process:
Meachum v. Fano, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 405, 431-39 (1977) (suggesting that an
"impact" or "grievous harm" analysis would be preferable to the Meachum Court's
reliance on a narrow "entitlement" view of procedural due process rights in light of prison
life realities).
102. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
103. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
104. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491.
105. Id. at 492-94.
106. IdL
107. Harper, 494 U.S. at 217.
108. Id. at 221-22; Vitek, 445 U.S. at 494. However, this holding in the Harper case
realistically had little meaning for the prisoner because his refusal of the drugs was
overridden. Harper, 494 U.S. at 222-23. The Court found that the procedural protections
afforded by the State were sufficient because medical personnel determined the drugs were
necessary given the "legitimate needs of his institutional confinement." Id. This is
arguably an issue of how much process is due rather than whether process is due. See
supra note 10. It is questionable, however, whether protection is afforded at all if the level
of process given is not meaningful. See Bradford L. Thomas, Restricting State Prisoners'
Due Process Rights: The Supreme Court Demonstrates Its Loyalty to Judicial Restraint, 22
CuMB. L. REv. 215, 242-44 (1992).
109. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493. This refers to the language in Montanye v. Haymes, 427
U.S. 236 (1976), stating that procedural protections are not required for changes in
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Significantly, while the Court in each case held that the inmate was
entitled to procedural protection regardless of any state-created right
or "justifiable expectation,"'"0 the Court also noted that there was
specific language in the applicable Nebraska statute.' and Washing-
ton policy" 2 that gave rise to a state-created liberty interest as
weUl. l 3
Outside the limited scope of involuntary treatment for mental
illness, however, the Court has been unwilling to find other prisoner
interests which are so fundamental as to rise to this level of inherent
protection. Since Wolff,"' the Court increasingly has looked
exclusively to positive state law to determine the "nature" 5 of the
interest at stake in order to determine whether the prisoner is entitled
to some procedural protection.
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional
Complex"6 was a clear example of the Court parsing the language
of a state statute in order to find a protected interest (an "enti-
tlement"), rather than looking to the seriousness ("grievousness") of
the loss at stake or weighing the relative interests of the state and the
condition "within the sentence imposed" regardless of the adverse impact on the prisoner.
lId at 242; see supra text accompanying note 99.
110. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489.
111. The relevant language provides that "when a physician or psychologist... finds
thht a person committed to the department [of corrections] suffers from a mental disease
or defect" the prisoner may be transferred "[ijf the physician or psychologist is of the
opinion that the person cannot be given proper treatment in that facility." NEB. REV.
STAT. § 83-180(1) (1976). The Court interpreted this to mean that a prisoner has a
justifiable expectation that he will not be transferred absent such findings and therefore
is entitled to "appropriate procedures" to determine if his condition warrants transfer to
a mental hospital. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489-90.
112. The "expression of state law" in Harper's case was a policy promulgated to govern
the Washington Department of Corrections Special Offender Center (SOC). Harper, 494
U.S. at 214-15; see supra note 41 (describing different forms of state law which may give
rise to a prisoner liberty interest). The Court found that in this case, the SOC policy
"confer[red] upon [Harper] a right to be free from the arbitrary administration of
antipsychotic medication" because the policy required findings of certain con-
ditions--"mental illness" and "gravely disabled" or "dangerous"--before an inmate could
be involuntarily treated. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221.
113. Harper, 494 U.S. at 221; Vitek, 445 U.S. at 489. This additional support for
decisions already grounded on an independent constitutional right appears to strengthen
the Court's primary preference for the "entitlement" view of prisoners' liberty interests.
114. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); see supra notes 80-88 and accompanying
text.
115. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564,570-71 (1972) ("[T]o determine whether
due process requirements apply in the first place, we must look not to the 'weight' but to
the nature of the interest at stake .. .
116. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
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prisoner."7 Greenholtz was a class action suit brought by Nebraska
inmates under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claiming unconstitutional denial of
parole release."' The inmates argued that the parole statutes and the
parole board's procedures did not afford them procedural due
process." 9 The Court held in Greenholtz that the mere possibility
of parole did not rise to the level of a "legitimate claim of entit-
lement," and therefore, the fact that a state had established a system
of parole did not in itself create a liberty interest in prisoners who
might benefit from that system.' The Court, however, accepted
the argument that the particular language of the statute created a
presumption ("a legitimate expectation") that parole release would be
granted absent one of four justifications for deferral.' 21 Because the
statute used the words "shall" and "unless,"'' 2 the Court found that
some measure of procedural protection was mandated.'23
Given the Greenholtz Court's earlier admonishment that "there
is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence,"' 4
the Court's holding that this particular statute did indeed create a
liberty interest was perhaps surprising. However, Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, went on to caution that "this statute
has unique structure and language and thus whether any other state
statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided on a case-
by-case basis."'"
117. Id at 11-12; see also Herman, supra note 101, at 513-15 (criticizing the Greenholtz
decision for its "preoccupation with statutory wording").
118. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 3-4.
119. Id at 4-5.
120. Id at 7, 11.
121. Id. at 11-12. The Nebraska statute provided in part that the Board of Parole
'shall" order the release of an offender being considered for parole
unless it is of the opinion that his release should be deferred because:
(a) There is a substantial risk that he will not conform to the conditions of
parole;
(b) His release would depreciate the seriousness of his crime or promote
disrespect for law;
(c) His release would have a substantially adverse effect on institutional
discipline; or
(d) His continued correctional treatment ... will substantially enhance his
capacity to lead a law-abiding life when released at a later date.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1114(1) (1976).
122. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12; see supra note 121.
123. Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11-12.
124. Id. at 7.
125. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). The apparently undesirable effect of this statement
was to invite close examination of particular statutory language in search of protected,
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The outcome at which the Court hinted in these earlier cases
came to fruition in Hewitt v. Helms," with the pronouncement of
a two-part test 27 for determining whether a state statute or regula-
tion created a liberty interest."z In Hewitt, a prisoner claimed a
violation of due process protection resulting from his confinement in
administrative segregation.129  First, the Court stated that while
"[1]iberty interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment may arise
from two sources-the Due Process Clause itself and the laws of the
States[,]"'' 0 Helms did not have a protected right to remain in the
general prison population by virtue of the Due Process Clause.''
Further, the Court stated that it had "never held that statutes and
regulations governing daily operation of a prison system conferred any
liberty interest in and of themselves."'3 ' Therefore, in order to find
that a state had in fact created a liberty interest in which a prisoner
had an entitlement to due process protections, a statute or regulation
must go "beyond simple procedural guidelines."'33 The statute or
regulation must contain "language of an unmistakably mandatory
character"'" and require "specified substantive predicates."' 3
The Court held that because the Pennsylvania regulations that
governed prison officials' authority to segregate prisoners contained
such mandatory language and substantive predicates, Helms "ac-
state-created interests. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299; see, e.g., Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482
U.S. 369, 381 (1987) (relying on Greenholtz for the holding that a Montana statute
contained language creating a liberty interest in parole release). In Allen, Justice
O'Connor sharply criticized both the majority and the Greenholtz decision in a dissent
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. She argued that "the Court has
abandoned the essential inquiry in determining whether a statute creates a liberty interest."
Allen, 482 U.S. at 385 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor disagreed with the
approach of looking for mandatory language purporting to create a standard rather than
determining whether the statute placed actual and meaningful constraints on official
discretion. Id at 384-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
126. 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
127. See infra text accompanying notes 134-35.
128. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72.
129. Id at 462.
130. Id. at 466.
131. Id. at 467.
132. Id. at 469.
133. Id at 471; see supra note 41.
134. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471. "Mandatory language," for example, requires that "certain
procedures 'shall,' 'will,' or 'must' be employed." Id.
135. Id. at 472. "Substantive predicates" are directions that action will not be taken




quire[d] a protected liberty interest in remaining in the general prison
population."'36
The application of the Hewin test in later cases resulted in
"anomalous" outcomes.Y7  If indeed the purpose of due process
protection is to protect against arbitrary abrogation of individual
rights by the government,'38 the process of "combing"'"9 state
prison statutes and regulations for mandatory language upon which
to hinge those rights has not served that purpose well. For instance,
in Olim v. Wakinekona,'4 the Court found no liberty interest
implicated when the State of Hawaii transferred an inmate to a prison
in California,' even though the loss was "grievous" indeed-result-
ing in the virtual exile of the inmate by separating him from his
family by an ocean.'42 The sole justification for denying the prison-
er a hearing was that because the state retained discretion to transfer
prisoners, the state had not created a constitutionally protected liberty
interest.43 Justice Marshall, however, noted in his dissent that
Hawaii's laws had imposed substantive criteria which limited or
guided the discretion of officials.'" In contrast, the Court in Board
of Pardons v. Allen 45 found a liberty interest in parole release
because the requisite "mandatory language" and "substantive
predicates" were present," 6 even though, as the dissent noted,
officials retained "sweeping discretion" in making parole decisions.47
136. Id. at 470-71. The specific language in the Pennsylvania regulation provides that
an inmate may be placed in segregated custody "not routinely but based upon [the
officer's] assessment of the situation and the need for control." Id. at 470 n.6 (citing 37
PA. CODE § 95.104(b)(1) (1978)). It further allows that temporary segregation may be
employed pending an investigation, but "[i]f no behavior violation has occurred, the inmate
must be released as soon as the reason for the security concern has abated." Id. (citing
§ 95.104(b)(1)).
137. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300 n.5.
138. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
139. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299.
140. 461 U.S. 238 (1983).
141. Id. at 251.
142. Id& at 252-53 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 249.
144. I1& at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall added this as an additional
reason for granting process, arguing, again, that the source of prisoners' due process rights
was the Constitution itself. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see supra note 45 (noting Justice
Marshall's consistent position that prisoners retain inherent liberty rights by virtue of the
Due Process Clause).
145. 482 U.S. 369 (1987).
146. Id. at 377-79.
147. Id. at 381 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra note 125. Lower courts struggled
to interpret and apply the Hewitt test to determine when "mandatory" language sufficiently
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Another important case in the saga leading to Sandin was
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Thompson,4 ' in which the
Court decided that Kentucky prison regulations did not give prisoners
a liberty interest in receiving certain visitors.'49 Here the Court
attempted to spell out its rationale for determining when prisoners'
liberty interests arise. Initially, the Court recognized that the purpose
of the Due Process Clause is to protect the individual against arbitrary
government action;50 however, the Court went on to state that the
interests which are entitled to protection are "not unlimited."''
Thompson summarized those actions that might warrant protection
under the Due Process Clause itself as arising only when the conse-
quences were "qualitatively" different from the normal punish-
ment. 52  Outside of these limited circumstances, the Court stated,
an inmate's right to procedural protections exists only when state law
creates an "enforceable liberty interest."'53 The Court went on to
repeat the Hewitt tests4 that such an interest was created when
statutes or regulations " 'plac[ed] substantive limitations on official
discretion' ""s by "establishing 'substantive predicates' to govern
limited official discretion to create an enforceable liberty interest. See, e.g., Colon v.
Schneider, 899 F.2d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 1990) (denying a prisoner's liberty interest in not
being maced, stating that "we have repeatedly rejected the notion that any and all state
prison rules and regulations containing [mandatory] language automatically create
'legitimate claims of entitlement' triggering ... procedural protections"); Stephany v.
Wagner, 835 F.2d 497, 502 (3d Cir. 1987) (holding that prison rules governing ad-
ministrative segregation did not create a liberty interest because they did not contain
"mandatory criteria" even though the rules specified circumstances when segregation was
appropriate), cerL denied, 487 U.S. 1207 (1988); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080,
1097-98 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that three sections of the state code governing administra-
tive segregation of prisoners, taken together, contained the necessary combination of
mandatory language and substantive predicates to create a liberty interest, even though
warden retained discretion), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1069 (1987).
148. 490 U.S. 454 (1989). See generally Joseph P. Messina, Kentucky Department of
Corrections v. Thompson: The Demise of Protected Liberty Interests Under the Due
Process Clause, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 233, 248-59 (1991)
(arguing that Thompson continued the Court's line of decisions narrowing prisoners' due
process rights by using a formalistic rather than a realistic approach to defining liberty
rights).
149. Thompson, 490 U.S. at 464.
150. Id. at 459-60 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1973)).
151. Id. at 460.
152. Id. (citing Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980)).
153. Id, at 461-62.
154. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.




official decision making and ... by mandating the outcome to be
reached upon a finding that the relevant criteria have been met."'156
The Thompson Court reasoned that the presence of the requisite
mandatory language resulted in conditions which an inmate "could
reasonably expect to enforce ... against the prison officials."' 57
However, an inmate's reasonable expectations have had little weight
in the Court's determination of protected liberty interests. For
example, Connecticut Board of Pardons v. Dumschat58 clearly
limited the creation of a liberty interest to those instances where the
written language of a statute itself was mandatory, regardless of
whether the actions of state officials in carrying out the statute were
consistent enough to give rise to an expectancy.'59 In Dumschat, a
pardons board was given "unfettered discretion"' ' to grant com-
mutations and pardons. Nevertheless, the board in fact granted
favorable action of some sort in seventy-five percent of cases similar
to the defendant's.' 61 The Court held, however, that "the mere
existence of a power to commute a lawfully imposed sentence, and
the granting of commutations to many petitioners, creates no right or
'entitlement.' ,162 This decision made it clear that only mandatory
language requiring state officials to act, or not act, on prescribed
grounds could create a liberty interest,'6 notwithstanding the
reasonableness of reliance on those officials' past actions." 4
The decision in Sandin made a clear break from the Hewitt line
of reasoning, which had defined prisoners' rights to due process
protection-in the context of prison officials' actions, disciplinary or
156. Id. (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 472 (1983)).
157. Id. at 465.
158. 452 U.S. 458 (1981).
159. Id. at 465.
160. Id. at 466.
161. Id. at 461.
162. Id. at 467.
163. Id.
164. The prison inmate's position is unique in this respect, compared to other
circumstances in which an individual's justifiable reliance is protected. See, e.g., Morrissey
v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (stating that a parolee has a liberty interest in retaining
freedom by having "relied on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only
if he fails to live up to the parole conditions"); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 600-02
(1972) (holding that a professor's "legitimate reliance" on rules and "mutual understan-
dings" supported his claim of entitlement to tenure). The Court has sometimes used the
language "justifiable expectation" in cases involving prisoners. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 489 (1980); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976). However, in
order to give rise to a protected liberty interest the Court has required the expectation to
be "rooted in state law," i.e., the required statutory language must be present. Montanye,
427 U.S. at 242.
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otherwise-in terms of strict statutory interpretation.'6a The Sandin
Court rejected the "mandatory" versus "discretionary" distinction,
which determined a prisoner's liberty interest based upon whether
language in a statute or prison regulation clearly limited a prison
official's discretion.'" The result in Sandin was not a complete
abandonment of the entitlement theory; the Court affirmed its holding
in Wolff that "under certain circumstances [states may] create liberty
interests which are protected by the Due Process Clause."'67
Exactly what those circumstances must be, however, is not entirely
clear from the new test Sandin establishes: State-created liberty
interests arise when a prisoner faces a deprivation which "imposes
atypical and significant hardship ... in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life."'8
The Court did not wholly reject or embrace the entitlement
theory of prisoners' right to due process; in fact, it hinted at a revival
of the "grievous loss" analysis.69 The language "atypical and
significant hardship" is reminiscent of "grievous loss," and the Court
also criticized the lower court for not examining the "real substance"
of the interest at stake. 7 However, the Court rejected the asser-
tion that any official discipline of prisoners implicated a liberty
interest.' 7'
The post-Wolff approach to the liberty interest inquiry, which
focused on the particular language of a statute or regulation to find
a state-created entitlement, had several negative effects that the
Sandin Court criticized and sought to remedy with the new test.'7 2
First, the Court stated that such a rule encouraged prisoners to
"comb" through regulations seeking "mandatory language upon which
to base entitlements to various state-conferred privileges."173 This
result was an improper use of prison statutes and regulations, the
Court said, because the primary purpose of these rules is to guide
officials' decisionmaking and not to create prisoner expectations. 4
165. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
166. Id But see supra note 125 (discussing Justice O'Connor's argument that this
inquiry was not applied in a meaningful way).
167. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
168. IM.
169. I at 2298; see supra notes 70, 77-78 and accompanying text.
170. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2298.
171. Idl at 2300.
172. IM. at 2299-300.




The Court reasoned that states would be discouraged from
regularizing prison management procedures if a codification of
administrative guidelines would inadvertently result in a state-created
liberty interest by use of "mandatory" language ("shall," "will," or
"must"). 7 This explanation suggests that prisoners would be better
protected by uniform treatment under regulations that guide and curb
official discretion but do not create legal entitlements than by a rule
that burdens the state with procedural requirements.
Next, the Court stated that the Hewitt approach involved the
federal courts too intimately in the operation and administration of
state prisons. 6 While the Sandin decision did not expressly revive
the "hands off" doctrine, 7 the Court clearly expressed a preference
for deferring to the states and to prison officials in managing the
"volatile environment" of prison life. 78 The majority here alluded
to many of the old rationales for the "hands off" doctrine: the need
for prison officials to have flexibility in dealing with security and
safety issues, 79 the expertise of prison officials and relative lack of
expertise of the courts,"s and the penalogical purpose of prison dis-
cipline.'' Also of concern to the Sandin Court was the preservation
of judicial resources,"s and in large part the decision to further limit
the circumstances under which protected entitlements arise was a
response to the perceived "explosion" of prisoner lawsuits." The
sampling of lower court cases listed in Sandin was clearly an attempt
to provoke concern, if not indignation, over the misuse of the court
175. Id.; see supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
176. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299.
177. See supra note 43.
178. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299.
179. i&
180. l&
181. Id. at 2301.
182. I. at 2299.
183. There is indeed a factual basis for the concern about increased use of the courts
by prisoners seeking § 1983 relief. In 1966, the first year federal courts reported this
statistic, 218 civil rights suits were filed by state prisoners; in 1976 there were 6,958, and
in 1986 there were 20,072 such cases. JIM THOMAS, PRISONER LITIGATION: THE
PARADOX OF THE JAELHOUSE LAWYER 110 (1988). However, the impact on the courts
may be much smaller than the numbers suggest. Only a small percentage of cases filed
actually result in a trial. In one study "only 18 of 664 cases... had either an evidentiary
hearing or trial," and only a small percentage of those were appealed. Turner, supra note
64, at 624; see also THOMAS, supra, at 184 (noting that only about five percent of prisoners'
civil rights suits went to trial between 1975 and 1985). Further, the increase in prisoner
suits does not appear as "explosive" when the tremendous growth in prison population is
considered. For example, the rate of lawsuit filings increased only from 2.95 to 4.14 per
100 prisoners from 1976 to 1986. THOMAS, supra, at 110.
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system by prisoners in pursuit of minor or frivolous deprivations of
"liberty"' -e.g., claiming a right to a tray lunch rather than a sack
lunch,"s claiming a liberty interest in receiving a dictionary,186 or
protesting the transfer to a cell with no electrical outlets."
However, the concern this reasoning should raise is that the percep-
tion of a federal judiciary "clogged" with unimportant claims is being
used as an excuse to significantly shrink the prison inmate's
procedural protection against very important and serious
deprivations."m
A "floodgates" argument, used to narrow due process protections
in the name of conserving judicial resources, "gives little weight to
achieving just results in individual cases." '89 In the case of DeMont
Conner, the liberty of which he claimed to have been deprived
without due process was not a lunch or a television. Conner was
sentenced to, and served, thirty days in solitary confinement as a
result of being charged with disciplinary misconduct." The
Hawaiian prison regulations provided that long periods of segregation
would be imposed for "serious" misconduct and that findings of guilt
must be supported by "substantial evidence."'' Further, solitary
segregation was inarguably a grievous loss, even for an inmate already
deprived of any semblance of free movement.' Yet the Court did
not find that Conner's confinement constituted the sort of "atypical
and significant hardship" that would implicate a liberty interest1 93
As justification for its holding, the Court found that in Conner's
case the disciplinary segregation that he endured "mirrored ...
184. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2299-300.
185. Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 1990).
186. Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 506-08 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
1054 (1986).
187. Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F2d 766, 768-69 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839 (1984).
188. See, e.g., Cerda v. O'Leary, 746 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (holding no violation
of due process where prisoner was confined to disciplinary segregation for seven days
without any charges against him). Justice Breyer addressed this issue in his dissent from
Sandin. See Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2308 (Breyer, J., dissenting). He pointed out that
separating the "unimportant from the potentially significant" involves "making... judicial
judgment[s which] seems no more difficult than many other judicial tasks." li. (Breyer,
J., dissenting); see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
189. Turner, supra note 64, at 629.
190. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2296.
191. Id. at 2296 nn.1 & 3.
192. Conner spent the entire 30 days isolated in his cell with the exception of
approximately 50 minutes per day for shower and exercise. During these brief periods he
was still kept apart from other inmates and held in leg irons and chains. Id. at 2305
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
193. Il at 2301.
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conditions imposed upon inmates in administrative segregation and
protective custody."' 94 The Court decided that because Conner's
sentence did not exceed "either in duration or degree"'95 restrictions
imposed for purely discretionary reasons, no state-created liberty
interest had arisen that entitled him to procedural protections. The
implication of the Court's reasoning is that if prison officials are given
discretion to treat some prisoners in certain ways for administrative
reasons, then they may treat all prisoners in the same manner, for
disciplinary reasons or for any reason at all, without procedural
requirements. Ironically, eliminating this emphasis on "discretionary"
versus "mandatory" actions was a stated purpose of the Court in
abandoning the Hewitt and Thompson methodology.'96
This was not an issue of whether Conner received sufficient
process, but whether he had a right to any process at all."9 Under
the Court's "atypical and significant hardship" test, he did not. 9
Given the rejection of solitary confinement as an atypical and
significant hardship,'99 however, it remains to be seen just what sorts
of state actions will implicate a liberty interest. Prior decisions have
held that transfer of an inmate to another prison with more severe
conditions' or to a prison in another state'° did not implicate
protected due process rights, and the Sandin Court cited these results
with approval. The only circumstance in which a prisoner might
be assured of procedural protections is when prison officials attempt
to take action involving the status of a mentally ill inmate which
"qualitatively" changes the terms or conditions of his con-
finement.' This Note does not suggest that Sandin stands for the
proposition that inmates have no remaining constitutional rights;
however, it is clear that prisoners now may be subject to a wide range
194. Id
195. Id
196. Id at 2300.
197. Id. at 2302. Justice Ginsburg noted in her dissent that while she would find that
Conner had a liberty interest, he did in fact receive sufficient process. Id at 2303
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
198. Id at 2301-02.
199. Id at 2301. The Court noted that it was not answering the question "whether
disciplinary confinement of inmates itself implicates constitutional liberty interests." Id
However, the Court minimized the importance of dicta in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 571 n.19 (1974), which suggested that solitary confinement might "automatically
triggerf due process protection." Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2301 (characterizing Wolff).
200. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228 (1976).
201. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 247 (1983).
202. Sandin, 115 S. Ct. at 2300.
203. Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493 (1980).
1996] 1781
1782 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74
of serious disciplinary and administrative actions without recourse to
constitutionally guaranteed procedural protections.
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